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ARTICLES
THE YOUNGER ABSTENTION DOCTRINE: PRIMARY
STATE JURISDICTION OVER LAW ENFORCEMENT
DAVID A. DITTFURTH*
As a teacher of a course on federal courts, I am regularly con-
fronted with the onerous task of explaining the abstention doctrines
which in this decade have been given so much attention by the
United States Supreme Court. These doctrines are represented by
judicial rules that generally require a federal trial court in appro-
priate circumstances to abstain from exercising subject matter ju-
risdiction although it clearly has the power to do so. As a result, the
particular case is shunted back into a state judicial system for deter-
mination. The most confusing of these doctrines is the one arising
in major part from Younger v. Harris. ' In short, this case stands for
the rule that once a state criminal prosecution has been initiated a
federal court may not interfere with that proceeding except under
extraordinary circumstances.2 One result is that a defendant in a
state criminal prosecution may not obtain equitable relief in federal
court even by showing the likelihood that the state law underlying
that proceeding is in violation of the United States Constitution. '
Were this explanation the end of it I would have little difficulty
in understanding the rule. The Supreme Court has, however,
stretched and pulled the Younger rule until the various facets of
that rule no longer seem logically consistent. Because it is no longer
restricted to state criminal proceedings4 or even to state proceedings
initiated prior to the commencement of the federal action, ' one is
presently hard put to achieve' a comprehensive perspective of the
* B.A., J.D., LL.M., University of Texas at Austin; Associate Professor of Law, St.
Mary's University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas.
1. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
2. See id. at 46. It is generally considered that equitable relief will be granted only upon
a showing of a great and immediate irreparable harm. Id. at 45-46..
3. Id. at 53-54. Equitable relief will issue only if the statute is in flagrant violation of
the United States Constitution. Id. at 53; see Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941).
4. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977)(civil action for fraudulently
receiving welfare payments); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338-39 (1977) (civil action involv-
ing judicial contempt proceedings); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (quasi-
criminal proceeding for violation of nuisance statute).
5. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975).
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doctrine represented by the Younger case. The Supreme Court also
has failed to define sufficiently the principles underlying Younger
to provide a tool for predicting future applications. As Justice
Rehnquist has remarked, this area is one "through which our deci-
sions have traced a path that may accurately be described as sin-
uous. ," My purpose in this article is to analyze the Younger rule and
the docrine it represents in order to find that thread of logical con-
sistency which ties together its seemingly disparate facets.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTION OF JURISDICTION
A person whose access to federal court is blocked by Younger
would ordinarily be seeking to avoid the necessity of exhausting
state judicial remedies and to obtain a federal trial forum for his
federal claims. By application of Younger, he is forced to try these
federal issues in a state trial court and to exhaust state appellate
court remedies.7 His federal claims then may possibly be heard by
the United States Supreme Court through appeal or certiorari.'
Although it may seem incongruous today that federal trial courts
are divested of jurisdiction over claims under the United States
Constitution, initially the federal courts did not possess any juris-
diction to hear constitutional challenges to state action.' Federal
trial courts were not even granted general federal question jurisdic-
6. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 479 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). This com-
ment was aimed at the problems involved in accommodating declaratory judgment procedure
with the needs of federalism. See id. at 479 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
7. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975).
8. See generally Comment, Restriction of Access to Federal Courts: The Growing Role
of Equity, Comity, and Federalism, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 320 (1977). The federal claimant might
also seek relief through use of a writ of habeas corpus. Relief from a state criminal prosecution
through the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by a federal court is available only to those
in custody who have exhausted all remedies available in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1970).
Also, removal of the state proceeding into federal court is not ordinarily available. Re-
moval of criminal prosecutions commenced in state court is limited to those prosecutions of
someone acting as an agent of or under the authority of the United States under the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 1442, of members of the armed forces of the United States under the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 1442a, or of someone who is either denied or cannot enforce in state courts
federal civil rights or is prosecuted for standing on such rights under the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1443. As construed, civil rights removal under section 1443 will not be available
unless the defendant shows that the statute under which he is prosecuted "is discriminatory
on its face and is clearly in conflict with a federal right relating specifically to racial equality."
14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3728, at 700
(1976); see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 n.28 (1972).
9. See generally, Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 TUL. L. REV. 362
(1942).
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tion until 187510 when "fear of rivalry with state courts and respect
for state sentiment were swept aside by the great impulse of na-
tional feeling born of the Civil War."I"Until that time state courts
acted as the basic trial courts for constitutional cases, subject only
to ultimate review by the United States Supreme Court. There had
been a special grant of federal question jurisdiction in the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871,12 but this jurisdiction was of much lesser import-
ance at the time. Section 1 of this Act was the origin of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Section
1983 creates a federal claim against any person who, "under color
of state law," deprives another of rights secured under the Constitu-
tion or federal law.
13
Even when the federal trial courts did gain federal question juris-
diction, they were still barred by the eleventh amendment from
hearing cases brought against a state, 4 The Supreme Court sub-
stantially removed this barrier in a series of cases between 1891
and 1908.'1 This series culminated with the landmark ease of Ex
parte Young'" in which the Court held that a state official who
threatens to commence proceedings in state court, either civil or
criminal, to enforce a statute which is unconstitutional may be en-
joined by a federal court. 7 The Supreme Court reasoned that since
a state does not authorize unconstitutional action, a state official
alleged to be acting unconstitutionally cannot be representing the
state." Through this logic the eleventh amendment was effectively
10. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (1875) (current version at 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1331 (West Supp. 1978)); see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 n.28 (1972).
11. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESs OF THE SUPREME COURT 64 (1928).
12. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
13. 42 U.S.C* § 1983 (1970) reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XI reads: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." Although the eleventh amendment expressly prohibits onlythe extension of federal
judicial power to cases brought against the state by a citizen of another state, the Supreme
Court applied it to suits against a state by its own citizens. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 6 (1890).
15. See 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNrrTD STATES HISTORY 715-17 (rev. ed.
1935).
16. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
17. See id. at 159-62.
18. Id. at 159-60.
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removed as a barrier to equitable actions based on the Constitution
in federal courts against state officials.
Section 1983, which has become the primary modern vehicle for
suits challenging the constitutionality under the fourteenth amend-
ment of state action, was rarely used in the first fifty years after its
enactment." Since 1960, however, there has been a dramatic in-
crease in the use of section 1983 for a number of reasons.'" First, the
years following 1960 have been years of intense civil rights activism
by Blacks, Mexican-Americans, women, and other groups. The fed-
eral courts have been viewed by these groups as a sympathetic gov-
ernmental authority and, therefore, have been used frequently by
those seeking to remove inequalities allegedly enforced by state au-
thorities. During this period, the Supreme Court and Congress were
expanding the categories of recognized civil rights and, through
reading various portions of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court expanded the number of constitu-
tional rights which restrict state action." Also, in 1961 the Court
held that even when state officials acted without authority or in
violation of state law, they were still acting "under color of state
law" for purposes of section 1983.22 In 1972, the Supreme Court
determined that section 1983 actions, whether asserting "property"
or "personal" rights, were based on the special federal question
jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and therefore, were not
subject to a jurisdictional amount requirement.3 Also in 1972, the
Court held in Mitchum v. Foster24 that section 1983 actions were
exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act'5 and, therefore, in such an
19. Only 19 decisions under section 1983 are noted in United States Code Annotated for
its first 65 years. Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1486 n.4 (1969).
20. In fiscal year 1972, approximately 8,000 cases were filed under the general heading
of civil rights. McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforce-
ment of Constitutional Protections, 60 VA. L. Rav. 1, 1 (1974).
21. See 13 C. WRIMHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3573,
at 487 (1975).
22. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). In so expanding the scope of a section
1983 action the Court held that the existence of a remedy under state law does not bar the
federal action. See id. at 183. In Monell v. Department of Social Servs., __ U.S. - , 98
S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978), the Court expanded the scope of section 1983 to include
actions against municipalities and other local governments. Monell overruled Monroe only
to the extent that Monroe excepted these parties from the scope of section 1983. See id. at
., 98 S. Ct. at 2038, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 638-39.
23. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 542 (1972).
24. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) reads: "A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
[Vol. 10:445
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action a federal court is not barred by that statute from enjoining
proceedings in a state court."6 Younger, however, already had estab-
lished a barrier that robbed this holding of much of its impact. 7
JUDICIAL RESTRICTION OF JURISDICTION: FROM EQUITABLE RESTRAINT TO
Younger
As early as 1888, the United States Supreme Court stated that a
federal court had no equitable jurisdiction to interfere with the pros-
ecution and punishment of crimes by the states." This theme of
equitable restraint and respect for state sovereignty, although dis-
cussed in terms of lack of jurisdiction, did not have the effect in
practice that was indicated by the language.29 Until the Ex parte
Young decision in 1908, the eleventh amendment remained as the
primary barrier to injunctions against state criminal prosecutions.3
After removing the eleventh amendment barrier, the Supreme
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judg-
ments." A federal statute prohibiting federal injunction of state court proceedings has been
in existence since 1793. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22 § 5, 1 Stat. 334 (1793) (current version
at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970)); see Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309
U.S. 4, 8-9 (1940)(on rehearing).
26. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972).
27. The Court in Mitchum decided only that the lower federal court was not deprived
of judicial power to enjoin proceedings in state court because of the statute. It did not dis-
turb the federal policy established in Younger against federal injunction of state criminal
proceedings. Section 1983 was held to be an exception to section 2283 "as expressly authorized
by Act of Congress." Id. at 242. The Court reasoned that the very purpose of section 1983
was to "interpose the federal courts between the states and the people, as guardians of the
people's federal rights" against state action either executive, legislative, or judicial. Id. at 242.
28. In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 210 (1888). "The office and jurisdiction of a court of
equity, unless enlarged by express statute, are limited to the protection of rights of property
[and cannot extend to] the prosecution, the punishment, or the pardon of crimes or misde-
meanors. ... Id. at 210. The reason for equitable restraint in the face of a request for
injunction of a criminal proceeding "is still more cogent where the respective courts belong
one to the state and the other to the Federal System." Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U.S. 148,
168 (1898). "[Tlhe Circuit Court . . . sitting in equity, was without jurisdiction to enjoin
the institution or prosecution of these criminal proceedings commenced in the state court."
Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 531 (1899).
29. One commentator argues persuasively that In re Sawyer paraded the rule as being
one prohibiting injunction of criminal prosecutions when, in fact, the exception to that rule
was so commonplace it covered the majority of cases. Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Crimi-
nal Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 740, 748-49 (1974).
30. In Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899) the Court stated that the lower federal court
was without jurisdiction to prohibit the institution or prosecution of state criminal proceed-
ings. Id. at 531-32. Even if the state statute on which the criminal proceedings were based
was unconstitutional, the Court reasoned, the citizen could make his defense on that basis
in the criminal proceedings. Id. at 530. The Court also found that the lower federal court
could not, consistent with the eleventh amendment, adjudicate this constitutional issue. See
id. at 528-29.
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Court in Ex parte Young. determined that a court of equity may
enjoin criminal proceedings if necessary to protect property rights
over which the court of equity had prior jurisdiction." The Court
limited this rule by noting that a federal court "cannot, of course,
interfere in a case where the proceedings were already pending in a
state court""2 because under these circumstances the pending state
criminal proceeding provides an adequate remedy at law for any
constitutional issue.33 In Ex parte Young, however, a test case would
not have been likely considering the prospect of imprisonment of up
to five years.
3
After Ex parte Young the doctrine of equitable restraint appears
much like virtue-more respected in word than in deed. In one 1927
opinion, the Supreme Court even turned the exception into the rule:
"Following the rule frequently announced by this court, that
'equitable jurisdiction exists to restrain criminal prosecutions under
unconstitutional enactments, when the prevention of such prosecu-
tions is essential to the safeguarding of rights to property,' we sus-
tain the jurisdiction of the district court. ' 35 Whatever the form of
these statements, the Supreme Court, more often than not, seemed
able to circumvent any supposed lack of equitable power and allow
the issuance of injunctions against state criminal prosecutions, at
least when the federal action was commenced prior to the state
criminal prosecution. 3 The contradiction between the theory and
31. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 162 (1908). "[I]f there were jurisdiction in a court of
equity to enjoin the invasion of property rights through the instrumentality of an unconstitu-
tional law, that jurisdiction would not be ousted by the fact that the State had chosen to
assert its power. . . by indictment or other criminal proceeding." Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co.
v. Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207, 218 (1903) (emphasis added). For a brief explanation of the rise
and fall of the rule restricting injunctions to the protection of property interests, see
Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HAav. L. REv. 994, 998-1001 (1965).
32. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 162 (1908).
33. The rule that equitable relief was available only when the remedy at law was inade-
quate arose initially because the court of chancery, to survive the jealousy of the common
law courts in England, was forced to interfere with those courts only when absolutely neces-
sary. See H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQuiTy 47 (2d ed. 1948).
34, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 164 (1908).
35. Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 428 (1927)(citing Packard v. Banton, 264
U.S. 140, 143 (1924)).
36. The Anti-Injunction Act appears to be the reason injunctions were not allowed in
already pending criminal proceedings in state court, but it was never treated as the absolute
barrier it seems to be. It was in fact viewed only as a general rule of comity. See Wells Fargo
& Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175, 183 (1920). In Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927),
the Court, upon noting that the federal plaintiff was the subject of a pending state criminal
prosecution, narrowed the lower court's permanent injunction in so far as it restrained pro-
ceedings actually pending. Id. at 466. The injunction was thereby modified to restrain only
future prosecutions after the Court went on to hold that the state anti-trust statute was in
[Vol. 10:445
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practice of equitable restraint continued without any clear resolu-
tion 7 until 1965 when the Supreme Court decided Dombrowski v.
Pfister.3" Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court in that case,
agreed that ordinarilly "federal interference with a State's good-
faith administration of its criminal laws is peculiarly inconsistent
with our federal framework," but when a state statute is facially
violative of first amendment rights federal courts must be able to
restrain state prosecutions. 11 The special circumstance present
when a void statute "chills" first amendment rights was seen as a
distinguishing factor in such a case from past cases in which equita-
ble relief was denied. 0 Further, equitable restraint is premised on
the assumption that state officials are enforcing criminal law in
"good faith."" In Dombrowski there were allegations that this as-
sumption was not the case since the state officials were enforcing the
law "without any hope of ultimate success, but only to discourage
appellants' civil rights activities."4
Dombrowski redefined the rule of equitable restraint so that fed-
eral courts, while ordinarily not allowed to restrain a state criminal
prosecution, could do so if the statute, which was the basis of that
prosecution, was in the eyes of the federal court facially violative of
first amendment rights. 3 If so, then "special circumstances" existed
justifying a finding that serious irreparable injury was threatened-
the "chilling" of protected rights of free speech." Also, in cases in
which bad faith administration of state criminal law was shown, the
reason for exercising restraint was not applicable and again the
federal court could grant equitable relief." Coming at a time when
Blacks were asserting themselves through marches, picketing, and
other sorts of protests against discriminatory state laws and offi-
violation of due process. Id. at 453. See also Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242
U.S. 559, 564 (1917).
37. See generally Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First
Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 740, 785-93 (1974).
38. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
39. Id. at 484.
40. See id. at 491.
41. See id. at 490.
42. Id. at 490.
43. See id. at 486. "When the statutes [regarding expression] also have an overbroad
sweep . . . . [tihe assumption that defense of a criminal prosecution will generally assure
ample vindication of constitutional rights is unfounded . Id. at 486.
44. See id. at 487.
45. See id. at 488-89. Considerations of federalism counsel against interference only with
the good faith administration of state law. There is no reason to restrain federal interference
with lawless behavior on the part of state officials.
19791
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cial attitudes, Dombrowski appeared as a sign from the Supreme
Court that the federal courts would now take a front line role in
bringing about equality under the law. This signal, in turn, brought
a substantial increase in federal litigation by those seeking relief
from prosecution under state laws that allegedly chilled first
amendment rights." This litigation brought the federal courts into
more frequent conflict with states' efforts to enforce their criminal
law and, as one commentator sees it, "touched off a crisis in federal-
state relations." 7 The Supreme Court turned again to the doctrine
of equitable restraint in the latter part of 1970 when it heard argu-
ments on six companion cases. On February 23, 1971, the Court
decided Younger v. Harris," Samuels v. Mackell," and their lesser
known companions,50 and in doing so put a brake to the use of
federal courts in obtaining equitable relief from state criminal law
enforcement.5
In Younger, John Harris, Jr. had been indicted in a California
state court for violation of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act
before he filed his complaint in federal court seeking to have Evelle
Younger, the District Attorney of Los Angeles County, enjoined
from prosecuting him in that state proceeding. As a basis for injunc-
tive relief Harris alleged that the Act inhibited him in the exercise
of his first and fourteenth amendment rights. A three-judge district
court declared the California Act void for vagueness and over-
breadth, and enjoined Younger from further prosecuting Harris. 2
Justice Black, speaking for the Supreme Court in Younger, found
no basis upon which to justify this injunctive relief.53 An obvious
barrier to the issuance of the injunction in this situation was the
Anti-Injunction Act, which prohibits injunctions by federal courts
to stay proceedings in a state court; but Justice Black saw a more
fundamental reason for barring relief." That reason was "the basic
46. See Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Signifi-
cance of Dombrowski, 48 TExAs L. REv. 535, 580-81 (1970).
47. Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger,
and Beyond, 50 TEXAS L. REv. 1324, 1325 (1972).
48. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
49. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
50. Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Perez
v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landy, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
51. See generally Geltner, Some Thoughts on the Limiting of Younger v. Harris, 32 OHIO
STATE L.J. 744 (1971); Shevin, Federal Intrusion in State Court Proceedings, 1972 UTAH L.
REV. 3 (1972).
52. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
53. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
54. See id. at 43-44.
[Vol. 10:445
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doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act,
and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution,
when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not
suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief."55 Justice Black
noted that state law enforcement officials should ordinarily be free
of such interference since "they are charged with the duty of prose-
cuting offenders against the laws of the State," 6 and no one is
"immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal
acts." 7 He also found specific justification for this doctrine of equi-
table restraint in the need "to prevent erosion of the role of the jury
and [to] avoid duplication of legal proceedings." ' The solicitude
in this case for the role of the jury evidently derives from an assump-
tion that the jury itself has some "right" to determine criminal
offenses, since the state court defendant is the one attempting to
avoid a jury trial in state court by bringing an equitable action in
federal court. To reinforce this basic doctrine of equitable restraint,
Justice Black found that the "more vital consideration" of comity
requires federal courts to show proper respect for state functions.'
Comity must also be viewed in light of the ideal of "Our Federal-
ism," which is defined as a system "in which the National Govern-
ment, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that
will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the
States." 0
With equitable restraint so established as a strong federal policy,
Justice Black turned to the facts of the case and found them devoid
of any extraordinary circumstances that would justify overriding
that policy." First, he held that Harris had an adequate remedy at
law since he had the opportunity to raise his constitutional claims
in defense of the pending prosecution in state court.2 Second, he
had not alleged or shown that this prosecution was brought in bad
faith or as one in a series of repeated prosecutions to which he would
be subjected and, therefore, had failed to show that he would suffer
55. Id. at 43-44.
56. Id. at 45 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926)).
57. Id. at 46 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 400 (1941)).
58. Id. at 44.
59. Id. at 44.
60. Id. at 44. See generally C. WRIGHT, LAw OP FEDERAL COURTS § 52A, at 229-36 (3d ed.
1976).
61. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1971).
62. Id. at 49.
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sufficient irreparable injury if equitable relief were denied."' Justice
Black distinguished Dombrowski as a case in which bad faith prose-
cution was shown.
6 4
In light of the strong policy represented by the doctrine of equita-
ble restraint, an ordinary showing of irreparable injury was insuffi-
cient unless it amounted to "both great and immediate" irreparable
injury." Neither a showing that Harris would suffer the injury of
having to defend himself in the state prosecution nor a showing that
the statute was unconstitutional was sufficient to satisfy this higher
standard for injunctive relief. Justice Black went on to distinguish
that part of Dombrowski that established an exception when the
state statute was facially violative of first amendment rights as a
case in which bad faith prosecution was shown, holding that the
"chilling effect" is not by itself sufficient to justify federal equitable
relief.66 To this lone remaining exception of bad faith state prosecu-
tion, Justice Black added at the end of the opinion that even when
bad faith cannot be shown other "extraordinary circumstances"
might exist to justify issuance of a federal injunction." An example
would be a state statute that is "flagrantly and patently violative
of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and
paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort
might be made to apply it.""
With Younger, the door that was opened for relief from state
prosecutions by Dombrowski's sensitivity for first amendment
rights was resoundingly closed, although perhaps not locked. The
doctrine of equitable restraint arose from Younger as a strong fede-
ral policy barring access to federal trial courts for injunctive relief
from pending state prosecutions. The companion case of Samuels
v. Mackell" made it clear that when this policy barred injunctive
relief, declaratory relief even though less intrusive was also barred
because of the same considerations which made injunctive relief
63. Id. at 49.
64. Id. at 50.
65. Id. at 46.
66. See id. at 50.
We recognize that there are some statements in the Dombrowski opinion that would
seem to support this argument [when a statute is facially violative of the first amend-
ment]. But, as we have already seen, such statements were unnecessary to the decision
of that case, because the Court found that the plaintiffs had alleged a basis for equita-
ble relief under the long-established standards [of bad faith prosecution].
Id. at 50.
67. See id. at 53-54.
68. Id. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941)).
69. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
[Vol. 10:445
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inappropriate.70 The Court, again speaking through Justice Black,
found that declaratory relief would have virtually the same impact
on state prosecutions as an injunction because of the res judicata
effect of the declaration.7
Under the rule of Younger and its companion cases, the federal
courts are prohibited from granting either injunctive or declaratory
relief to relieve a defendant in a state prosecution begun prior to the
filing of a complaint with the federal court.72 The theory underlying
the rule is that because of the presence of the pending state proceed-
ing the defendant has the opportunity to present his constitutional
claims to the state court and, therefore, has an adequate remedy at
law: A showing of irreparable injury, which by necessary implication
is also a showing of inadequate remedy,73 can only be made by proof
that the prosecution was brought in bad faith or was brought as one
in a series of prosecutions which considered together show bad faith
on the part of the prosecutorial officials.7 In the absence of this
showing the defendant may obtain federal equitable relief only if he
can convince the federal court that the state statute used as a basis
for the prosecution is flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions in every part or that other
"extraordinary circumstances" exist. 5
The old doctrine of equitable restraint restricted equity jurisdic-
tion on the premise that equity existed only to protect property
rights; and since criminal prosecutions affected only personal rights,
equity was irrelevant to the administration of criminal law.7 After
Ex parte Young, however, the Court's emphasis shifted from
concern for the conceptual limitations of equity to consideration
of the needs of state law enforcement in the exercise of equitable
70. See id. at 72-73.
71. Id. at 72.
72. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S.
66, 68-69 (1971); Boyle v. Landy, 401 U.S. 77, 81 (1971). See generally, Soifer & Macgill, The
Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TXAs L. REv. 1141 (1977).
73. This point is developed more fully in later textual analysis of the Younger progeny.
In short, the Court assumes the adequacy of state court proceedings unless the federal plain-
tiff cannot present his federal claims or cannot receive a fair and competent hearing. In this
sense, bad faith prosecution or harassment becomes only one way of showing the inadequacy
of the state court proceeding.
74. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49 (1971).
75. See id. at 53.
76. See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1024 (1965). "Injury
to property, whether actual or prospective, is the foundation on which the jurisdiction [of
an equity court rests. The court has no jurisdiction in matters criminal or merely immoral,
which do not affect any right to property." In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 213 (1888).
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discretion." In Younger equitable restraint was transformed by
"Our Federalism" into a rule prohibiting federal equitable interfer-
ence with state prosecutions and leaving no room for federal court
discretion. In other words, Younger shifted the emphasis from equi-
table restraint to restraint. Additionally, as shown by the extensions
of Younger, the generalized rationale for equitable restraint does not
limit the growth of Younger. Younger is a discrete doctrine with a
rationale more complex and compelling than that of the old, now
subdued, doctrine of equitable restraint.
To understand and to be able to predict the future application of
the Younger rule, one must understand the interests served by
that rule. Weighing against the Younger rule is the federal interest
in protecting constitutional rights. Federal courts are seen as
having special sensitivity and sympathy for, as well as expertise in
dealing with these federal rights. This interest in protecting consti-
tutional guarantees is disserved, however, only if one begins with
the assumption that not only are the federal courts the primary
guardians of the Constitution but that they are the only competent
guardians.7 8 This assumption is justified to some degree because
federal judges enjoy life tenure while most state judges are subject
to the popular political process. Life tenure protects federal judges
in their determination of constitutional issues, which may often re-
quire impartial consideration of positions that are contrary to the
strongly-held attitudes of the majority of people. State judges, be-
cause of their vulnerability to removal, must in these circumstances
show courage in the face of the majority will just to remain impar-
tial. Assumptions about their impartiality may well be unjustified
when these cases are also highly controversial. This argument, how-
ever, directly supports only an exception for those cases rather than
a general assumption that state courts are unable to provide an
adequate forum for the trial of constitutional issues. The Supreme
Court has refused to assume the incompetency of state courts in
deciding constitutional issues, clearly holding that unless distinct
evidence of bad faith is shown state courts are to be considered as
competent as federal courts to try constitutional issues.7 9 Related to
77. See Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926).
78. "That is what's meant by federal judicial primacy: the belief that federal courts have
the primary responsibility for protecting federal rights because it is in those courts, and not
the state courts, where federal rights are most likely to be vindicated-not always, but more
often than not ....... Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First
Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 740, 893 (1974).
79. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
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this interest is the provision of free access to federal courts for the
trial of federal issues.9 This interest of the individual litigant clearly
has been undercut by Younger and the Court has noted the defi-
ciency of any presumption that everyone has a right to a federal trial
of every federal issue."' When Younger applies, the individual has a
state forum for determination of his federal claims; and this forum
is assumed to be competent for that task, especially since there is
always the opportunity to seek a hearing before the United States
Supreme Court.
On the other side of the scale are several interests in favor of the
Younger rule of nonintervention. Younger protects a state's ability
to control the interpretation and application of its law. Addition-
ally, since the effect of Younger is to require the individual to make
his constitutional defenses in state court, the state court is thereby
given the first opportunity to narrowly interpret the challenged stat-
ute in order to remove any constitutional deficiencies. These inter-
ests, although constituting part of the justification for the Younger
rule, are also relevant to a decision by a federal court to abstain
under the authority of Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.
8 2
Pullman abstention is more clearly based on a decision to serve
these interests in addition to the federal interest of avoiding unnec-
essary adjudication of substantial constitutional issues. 3 Pullman
abstention generally is required when a case in federal court in-
volves a substantial constitutional issue which may be obviated by
the determination of an unclear issue of state law.8' If the federal
court orders abstention in this situation, it will retain jurisdiction
over the case but send the parties to state court in order to secure a
definitive opinion on the unclear issue of state law. 5 As a general
rule, the parties must institute the action in state court although
they can return to the federal court if necessary for trial on the
80. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) (West Supp. 1978). See generally Forrester, The Nature
of a Federal Question, 16 TuL. L. REV. 362 (1942).
81. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 605-06 (1975). "But quite apart from
appellee's right to appeal [to the United States Supreme Court] had it remained in state
court, we conclude that it should not be permitted the luxury of federal litigation of issues
presented by ongoing state proceedings, a luxury which . . . is quite costly in terms of the
interests which Younger seeks to protect." Id. at 605-06.
82. 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
83. See id. at 501. See generally Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope
of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 1071 (1974).
84. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WE-CHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 991 (2d ed. 1973).
85. Id. at 1005-06.
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federal issues. 6 The effect of Younger abstention is quite different
since the federal court under Younger may not retain jurisdiction
unless the extraordinary circumstances allowing equitable relief are
shown."'
A significant factor for application of Younger abstention is the
existence of a state action against the federal plaintiff."' There is no
such requirement for abstention under Pullman."' A pending pro-
ceeding may have some significance for Pullman abstention in that
it alleviates some of the delay and added expense to the litigants
resulting from abstention, but this fact is not a key element in
motivating a court to order Pullman abstention."0 The decision in
Younger turned on the existence of a pending state criminal prose-
cution against the person seeking relief in federal court. Justice
Black saw these circumstances as implicating the principles of equi-
table restraint, comity, and federalism which counsel against inter-
vention by federal courts." The Court in subsequent opinions, how-
ever, has applied Younger when the pending state proceeding was
civil rather than criminal and when the state proceeding was not
pending at the time the federal action was commenced. 3 It is this
expanded application of Younger which makes the mechanics of the
rule so hard to understand and which throws the interests underly-
ing the rule out of focus.
ExPANSION OF Younger PROTECTION TO STATE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd." the Supreme Court decided that
Younger was applicable to a case in which the state was seeking a
86. The party seeking to return to federal court must not only present the state issues
to the appropriate state court but present them in light of the constitutional issues raised.
See Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm., CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366
(1957). In order to preserve those constitutional issues for federal adjudication and avoid res
judicata, the party must inform the state that the federal claims are being presented only in
compliance with Windsor and are to be ultimately decided in federal court. See England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 421 (1964).
87. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1043 (2d ed. 1973).
88. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
89. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1971).
90. See Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 478 (1971).
91. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).
92. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1978)(civil action for fraudulently
receiving welfare payments); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338-39 (1977)(civil action involving
judicial contempt proceeding); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975)(quasi-
criminal civil action).
93. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 338 (1975).
94. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
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civil remedy." The Court held that federal equitable relief was pro-
hibited when the civil proceeding was instituted by state officials
and was a proceeding that was "both in aid of and closely related
to criminal statutes."" The purpose of the state civil public nuis-
ance action pending in Huffman'was to prevent the dissemination
of obscene material, which was also the purpose of the state's crimi-
nal obscenity laws. 7 Because of this close relation federal court
interference was deemed inappropriate because of the same consid-
erations that apply when the state proceeding is purely criminal.8
Justice Stewart, concurring in Younger, had noted that the classifi-
cation of conduct as criminal indicated the importance ascribed by
the state to the prevention of that conduct and thereby evidenced
the importance.of the interest involved in a criminal prosectution."
In Huffman the Court found that the state interest involved was
sufficiently important for application of Younger by concluding that
it was the same interest promoted in related state criminal laws",
and by assuming the state interest is always sufficiently important
for Younger purposes when advanced through a state criminal pros-
ecution.'0 ' In this fashion the state interest promoted in the civil
proceeding was found sufficiently important to call forth the protec-
tive shield of Younger.'"'
Consideration of a particular state interest promoted by the sub-
stantive litigation in state court was novel since Younger had not
previously been keyed to any such distinction. Analysis of the rela-
tive importance of federal and state interests to determine which
court takes jurisdiction was one method by which the Supreme
Court in Dombrowski decided in favor of a federal forum. In that
case, at least one basis for the decision was the belief that first
amendment rights were so important that when a federal court
found a state criminal statute facially violative of the first amend-
ment it could give equitable relief from prosecution under that stat-
ute.'"3 Younger clearly overruled that branch of Dombrowski and the
approach on which it was based.'' Further, the importance of the
95. See id. at 594.
96. Id. at 604.
97. Id. at 604.
98. Id. at 604.
99. See 401 U.S. 37, 55 n.2 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
100. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
101. Id. at 604.
102. Id. at 604.
103. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489 (1965).
104. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50 (1971).
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substantive interest promoted in a state civil proceeding cannot be
determined in a vacuum. As the Court has noted in another context,
"[one cannot meaningfully ask how important something is with-
out first asking 'important for what purpose?' """i Importance of
a state interest can, therefore, be determined only in light of the
stated aims of Younger; but a state interest in prohibiting the dis-
semination of obscene material has no relevance itself to the aims
of Younger. Whether that prohibition is a sufficiently important
state interest for Younger purposes cannot therefore be determined
in relation to promoting respect for state functions and serving the
needs of federalism. The presence of the state as a party to the state
civil proceeding does, however, seem clearly relevant to those aims.
If comity is required, it should certainly be required when the state
itself seeks redress, criminal or civil, in its own courts for violation
of its own law. State courts would also seem the place where sensi-
tivity for the legitimate functions of the state was highest. If the
Court is only concerned with the importance of a particular interest
in the eyes of the state, then it can be assumed that this test is
satisfied whenever the representatives of the state decide the inter-
est is so important that it requires legal action for its protection.
In Juidice v. Vail0 1 the Court seemingly abandoned the quasi-
criminal analysis of Huffman, 0 but continued its concern with the
importance of the state interest as a key factor in applying
Younger. 0 1s The Vail case had been brought in federal court by judg-
ment debtors in New York who had failed to comply with subpoenas
requiring them to attend depositions at which they were to give
information relevant to the satisfaction of the judgments against
them. The debtors' failure to comply with these subpoenas resulted
in the institution of statutory contempt procedures against them.
105. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9 (1965). In holding that a state statute
requiring in hand service of process was not applicable in a diversity case the Supreme Court
reasoned that the importance of the state rule for Erie purposes can be considered only in
light of the twin aims of Erie, which are discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of
inequitable administration of the laws. The lower court had failed to relate that question to
the purposes of the Erie doctrine and had framed the "inquiry in terms of how 'important'
[the statute] is to the State." Id. at 468 n.9.
106. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
107. Id. at 334. The Court held that Younger and Huffman were not restricted to similar
types of state actions. Id. at 334. The Court in a footnote postponed the question whether
Young applied to all civil litigation. Id. at 336 n.13.
108. Id. at 335. The state's interest in the contempt process is "[plerhaps ... not quite
as important as is the State's interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws . . . [blut we
think it is sufficiently great import as to require application of the principles of [Younger]
..... " Id. at 335.
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They brought the federal action seeking to enjoin the use of these
statutory contempt procedures by New York judges, who were
named as defendants. The Supreme Court concluded that the
"contempt power lies at the core of the administration of a State's
judicial system" and that federal interference would be every bit as
great as with a criminal proceeding. 09 Justice Brennan, in dissent,
pointed out that a significant distinction between Vail and Huffman
was that the underlying state suit in Vail was between purely pri-
vate parties."10 He believed that remitting the constitutional issues
to the state court in this situation would actually undermine state
interests since the constitutionality of the statute would be left to
the abilities and resources of a private party who may not have the
same motivation as the state in sustaining it."' In contrast, a federal
court action brought under section 1983 must name the state offi-
cials and directly question the validity of the statute. "2 Even though
the state in Vail was not a party to the main action in state court,
it was represented in the contempt proceedings and in the federal
proceeding by the state judges who were attempting to enforce
state law against the judgment debtors." 3
The Vail opinion is incomplete, however, because the Court did
not question the ability of those state judges to provide an impartial
forum for the adjudication of the constitutional issues. In state
court the state judges would be acting as representatives of the
state in enforcing state contempt laws and would also be expected
to provide an impartial tribunal for the constitutional issues raised
by that enforcement. In Gibson v. Berryhill' the Supreme Court
held that a lower federal court need not defer under Younger to a
state tribunal that was incompetent by reason of bias to adjudicate
the constitutional issues before it."1 One can reasonably conclude
109. Id. at 335-36.
110. Id. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. See id. at 345 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 346 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 335-36 n.12. The state judges could be considered as representatives of
the authority of the state because of the nature of the proceedings. Although available for
use in private litigation, contempt proceedings could be initiated only by judges as represen-
tatives of the state when acting to vindicate the "regular operation of [the state's] judicial
system." See id. at 335-36 n.12. "[A]n injunction against state court judges, preventing them
from exercising state-authorized judicial process vital to the administration of justice, impli-
cates the federalism and comity strand of the Younger doctrine much more severely than
would an injunction here preventing private litigants from pursuing their quiet title actions
in state court." Johnson v. Kelly, 583 F.2d 1242, 1249 (3d Cir. 1978).
114. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
115. See id. at 577. In Gibson optometrists employed by Lee Optical sought a federal
injunction to halt proceedings then pending against them before the Alabama Board of
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from this decision that had the federal plaintiffs in Vail shown bias
on the part of the state tribunal, they would have rebutted the
presumption that they were "accorded. . . an opportunity to fairly
pursue their constitutional claims in the ongoing state proceed-
ings.",1
6
Justice Stevens, concurring in Vail, disagreed with the majority's
application of Younger because in Vail the debtors had challenged
the contempt procedure itself as a violation of due process." 7 When
such a claim is made, Justice Stevens reasoned, the federal plain-
tiffs have directly challenged the adequacy of their remedy in state
court and since Younger is premised on the adequacy of this rem-
edy, the Supreme Court must permit the determination of that
constitutional issue in federal court."' The Court, however, believed
that it was "abundantly clear that appellees had an opportunity to
present their federal claims in the state proceeding [and that]
[n]o more is required to invoke Younger abstention.""' Implicit in
the majority opinion is the reply that adequacy of the remedy in
state court is presumed as long as the debtors had the opportunity
to present their constitutional defenses and as long as there was no
showing of extraordinary circumstances. The divergence between
Justice Stevens' argument that a due process challenge to the state
procedure itself requires a federal court determination of the ade-
quacy of the state remedy and the main thrust of Younger is that
Younger requires the resolution of all doubts in favor of the state
proceeding. Realistically, allowing avoidance of Younger even tem-
porarily on the basis of every due process challenge to the state
proceeding itself would open the door to frequent federal court dis-
Optometry on charges of unprofessional conduct. A three-judge federal court held that the
board was biased and could not provide the federal plaintiff a fair and impartial hearing in
conformity with due process of law. The district court based its conclusion on two grounds.
First, the board was hearing charges against these optometrists that were substantially simi-
lar to charges the board had brought in state court against their employer, Lee Optical. The
board, therefore, was too involved in the prosecution of the case to be a fair and impartial
adjudicative body for those charges and any constitutional defenses asserted. Second, the
board was composed solely of optometrists engaged in private practice and the revocation of
the licenses of employed optometrists would remove nearly half of the licensed optometrists
in Alabama, thereby resulting in financial benefit to the members of the board. Id. at 568-
71. The Supreme Court affirmed only on the second ground. While stating that arguably the
lower court was correct on both counts, the Court noted the divergent views among federal
courts toward the degree of involvement by the adjudicative body in the prosecution of a state
law and what degree amounted to bias. See id. at 579 n.17.
116. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 340-41 (Stevens, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 340-41 (Stevens, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 337 (emphasis supplied by the Court).
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ruption of state law enforcement litigation. The opportunity to halt
a state proceeding by virtue of a properly worded due process chal-
lenge filed in federal court would be a beacon to conscientious coun-
sel seeking to provide the best representation to a state court defen-
dant. Baseless as well as sound due process claims would necessitate
interruption of state proceedings while federal courts determined
these claims. This frequent interruption and delay is precisely what
the Younger rule was formulated to prevent. Justice Stevens' pro-
posed rule would provide an escape from Younger similar in scope
to that of Dombrowski-substituting due process for free speech.
Presuming the adequacy of the remedy in state court as long as
there is an opportunity to present federal defenses before a compe-
tent state tribunal precludes a rush to the federal courthouse.
Therefore, as an initial barrier Younger may be avoided only when
the federal plaintiff can rebut this presumption with proof that a
particular state tribunal is clearly imcompetent to decide his consti-
tutional claims. Further, the types of incompetency recognized as
exceptions to Younger are those which would strongly support the
inference that the state tribunal was guilty of more than error or
mistake or even a conservative preference for state law. The infer-
ence necessary for escape from Younger is that something other than
reasoned adjudication will control the determination of the federal
issues in state court.
Slightly more than two months after Vail was decided the Court
again took up the issue of the application of Younger to state civil
proceedings in Trainor v. Hernandez. 110 In this case the Illinois De-
partment of Public Aid (IDPA) filed a civil suit in state court seek-
ing the return of welfare payments from Juan and Maria Hernan-
dez, who had allegedly concealed assets while receiving assistance.
Fraudulent concealment of assets for the purpose of receiving wel-
fare was also a crime under Illinois law. The IDPA caused the issu-
ance of a writ of attachment freezing money belonging to the defen-
dants deposited in a credit union. After receiving notice of the suit
and the attachment and before they filed an answer to either the
suit or the attachment, the defendants filed suit in federal court
alleging that the Illinois Attachment Act was unconstitutional in
that it deprived them of property without the prior notice required
by due process. A three-judge district court refused to dismiss the
federal suit under Younger, distinguishing Huffman on the ground
that the state statute challenged in that case gave an exclusive right
120. 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977).
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of action to the state whereas in Trainor the Attachment Act pro-
vided a remedy to any litigant and it was "mere happenstance" that
the state of Illinois was using the remedy."' The Supreme Court, in
a decision to which Justices Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, and Ste-
vens dissented, brushed aside this distinction noting only that the
state was, in fact, a party to an action brought to "vindicate impor-
tant state policies" and held Younger applicable.' The particular
state interest safeguarded by the IDPA suit was the public assis-
tance programs which, although not as important as the state's
interest in enforcement of its criminal laws, was deemed important
enough for Younger protection.' 3 The Court also saw as significant
the state's option of vindicating these interests through a criminal
proceeding but did not base its decision on whether the state pro-
cess was civil, criminal, or quasi-criminal.'
Justice Blackmun, as the swing vote, wrote a concurring opinion
in which he pointed out that he agreed with application of Younger
because the state was a party in its sovereign capacity and was
seeking to enforce a substantial state interest.' 5 He also thought it
significant that the state had the option of proceeding either civilly
or criminally against the state defendants,' 6 and he concluded that
it was reasonable to distinguish between the state as creditor and a
private party as creditor in regard to the attachment procedures
because the "benefits of the recovery of fraudulently obtained funds
are enjoyed by all the taxpayers of the State.""' The Court, how-
ever, remanded the case so the district court could determine
whether the state defendants had an opportunity to present their
121. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757, 760 (N.D. Il. 1975), rev'd sub nom.
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
122. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977).
123. Id. at 444. The Court continues comparing apples and oranges by relating a particu-
lar substantive state interest, the fiscal integrity of its public assistance programs, to the
state's interest generally in criminal proceedings. "[Tihe principles of Younger and Huffman
are broad enough to apply to interference by a federal court with an ongoing civil enforcement
action such as this, brought by the State in its sovereign capacity." Id. at 444 (emphasis
added).
124. Id. at 444.
125. Id. at 448-49.
126. Id. at 449.
127. Id. at 450 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He also attempted to show that a state's
interest has insufficient "importance" for Younger purposes if a state court action has not
been initiated. In such circumstances, Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), held that
declaratory relief could be considered in federal court. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434,
449 (1977). This argument supports the previously discussed conclusion that a state's interest
should be considered sufficient for Younger purposes if the state brings suit in state court
to protect that interest.
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federal consitutional claims in the pending state proceeding. "
Justice Stevens, in dissent, reasoned among other things that the
due process challenge to the state procedure should be sufficient to
avoid application of Younger.2 ' Justice Brennan, also in dissent,
noted that restraint of the attachment procedures would not stop
the state from proceeding to judgment in the main state court ac-
tion and, therefore, would not hinder the state from vindicating its
interests in its courts. 130 He concluded that the Court's proposition
that the "interest of the State in continuing to use an unconstitu-
tional attachment mechanism to insure payment of a liability not
yet established brings into play 'in full force' 'all the interests of
comity and federalism' present in a state criminal prosecution
[was] simply wrong" since the relief granted in no way "interfered
with or prevented" the state proceeding.''
Two significant factual differences between Trainor and the rele-
vant precedents caused the Court difficulty. First, as noted by the
three-judge district court the Illinois Attachment Act is not a public
law in the sense that only the state acting as representative of the
public interest may enforce it.3' Second, the injunction dissolving
the attachment did not necessarily halt the state from proceeding
to recover a judgment on the merits. 33 An explanation of the Court's
decision lies in an analogy to a line of cases beginning with
Stefanelli v. Minard. 31 In Stefanelli the Court established the rule
that federal courts will ordinarily not enjoin the use of illegally
obtained evidence in state prosecutions.3 5 Upholding the refusal of
the lower federal court to hear a complaint seeking an injunction
against the use of illegally obtained evidence in a state criminal
,trial, Justice Frankfurter based the opinion on the doctrine of equi-
table restraint. 3 He reasoned that "[i]f the federal equity power
must refrain from staying State prosecutions outright to try the
central question of the validity of the statute on which the prosecu-
tion is based, how much more reluctant must it be to intervene
128. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 447-48 (1977).
129. Id. at 466-67, 469-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 454 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 454 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757, 760 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd sub nom.
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
133. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 450 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
135. Id. at 120; see, e.g., Bokulich v. Jury Comm'n, 394 U.S. 97, 98 (1969); Cleary v.
Bolger, 371 U.S. 392, 396 (1963); Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 385 (1961).
136. See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951).
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piecemeal to try collateral issues." 7 To do otherwise, he concluded,
would invite frequent interruption of state court proceedings
through the use of a vast array of procedural due process chal-
lenges. 138 The collateral challenge made in federal court would ordi-
narily disrupt the main state court proceedihg; therefore, allowing
these challenges just because they related to collateral issues would
still frustrate the policies reflected by the equitable restraint doc-
trine. In Perez v. Ledesma,13' a companion case to Younger, the
Supreme Court reversed the order of a three-judge district court
suppressing evidence that was to be used in a state criminal trial. 140
The Court noted that this lower court order would "effectively sti-
fle" the state proceeding.' In Trainor, however, no such restraint
of the main judicial proceeding would occur since the state court
could proceed to trial on the merits regardless of the federal court
action regarding the Attachment Act. On the other hand, the collec-
tion of that judgment and the achievement of the state's purpose
in bringing the suit would certainly be hindered by the federal
court's dissolution of the attachment. In one sense the judgment is
really only one step in the enforcement of the state law; the last and
most important step is collecting the money wrongfully paid the
Hernandez family.
In interpreting the words "proceedings in a State Court" con-
tained in an earlier version of the Anti-Injunction Act, the Su-
preme Court stated that this language encompasses "all steps
taken or which may be taken in the state court or by its officers
from the institution to the close of the final process . . . [includ-
ing] any proceeding supplemental or ancillary taken with a view to
making the suit or judgment effective."'4 2 It can certainly be said
that the dissolution of the attachment reduces the possibility of
collecting any fraudulently paid welfare money and thereby does
hinder the state in making any judgment effective.
In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd."3 the lessee of a theatre had been
made a defendant to a civil nuisance suit brought by state officials
in a state court which entered a judgment closing the theatre for
one year."' The state court judgment was entered prior to the filing
137. Id. at 123.
138. See id. at 123.
139. 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
140. Id. at 84.
141. Id. at 84.
142. Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935).
143. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
144. Id. at 595-96.
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of the federal complaint that resulted in a federal injunction re-
stricting the enforcement of that judgment.'45 The federal plaintiff
argued, in part, that Younger did not apply since the pending state
proceeding had terminated when the judgment was entered. The
Supreme Court found that an intrusion after judgment was even
more disruptive and offensive to the state because it had already
gone to the trouble of obtaining the judgment. 48 The effect of de-
ciding that a "pending state proceeding" ended when a final judg-
ment was entered would blunt the effect of a state court judgment
-a result Younger cannot allow. Younger protection would truly
be illusory if the state was left unprotected just at the moment it
was about to realize something from its efforts. In a similar fashion,
failure to protect the state attachment proceedings allows the state
to proceed but only to acquire what may well be a worthless judg-
ment.47
One of the greatest barriers to understanding Younger abstention
is the failure to realize that the question of the constitutionality of
a state statute is irrelevant for Younger purposes. Justice Brennan,
dissenting in Trainor, saw as unacceptable the expansion of
Younger to protect an unconstitutional attachment proceeding. 4 '
The Court, however, proceeded to its ultimate conclusion without
considering the merits of the constitutional issue. 4' Justice Brennan
as a consistent dissenter to the application of Younger""1 finds unac-
ceptable the proposition that under Younger a state court action is
allowed to proceed on the basis of what may appear to a federal
judge to be an unconstitutional statute. His position ultimately is
based on his view of federal courts as the "primary guardians of
constitutional rights."'51 The majority of the Court, however, has
clearly indicated that when Younger applies the interests which
support providing a federal trial forum to vindicate constitutional
145. Id. at 598.
146. Id. at 608-09.
147. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) is not to the contrary. In that case the
Supreme Court distinguished Huffman because Mr. Maynard did not seek to have his record
expunged or to annul any effects of his previous convictions. See id. at 710-11. In Huffman
the lessee of the theatre was trying to have the federal court restrain the enforcement of the
state court judgment. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 592 (1975).
148. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 458-60 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
149. See id. at 446-47.
150. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 328, 341 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Huff-
man v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 613 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 58 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 104 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part).
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rights are secondary to the interests of the state in controlling the
enforcement of its law in its own courts.'52 An exception exists, how-
ever, when the challenged state statute is not simply unconstitu-
tional but in addition is "flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph,
and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be
made to apply it."' 5 The district court in Trainor held that a num-
ber, but not all, of the sections of the challenged state statute were
"on [their] face patently violative of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."' The
Supreme Court thought this was not the "flagrantly and patently"
finding required.'55 Justice Stevens, dissenting, reasoned that the
Court must mean that every section of a statute must be "flagrantly
and patently" unconstitutional before the exception to Younger
would apply.'56 If this is so, he concluded "this treatment preserves
an illusion of flexibility in the application of a Younger- type ab-
stention, but it actually eliminates one of the exceptions from the
doctrine."' 57
No explanation is given by the Court for its holding in Trainor on
this point, but it can be argued that the district court's finding was
defective primarily because it was made before the state court had
an opportunity to act on the constitutional challenge.15 The state
was thereby deprived of an opportunity to set its house in order by
striking down the statute. The premise underlying Younger is that
"ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair
and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional
rights";'5" and, therefore, the accused must at least initially present
his federal claims in the state court proceeding. If it is to be pre-
sumed that the state court provides a fair and sufficient forum for
constitutional issues, then the state court must also be trusted to
152. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
153. Id. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)).
154. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757, 762 (N.D. I1. 1975), rev'd sub nor.
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
155. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1977). The Court held that even if
a "flagrantly and patently" finding was made, it would not be warranted under recent case
law.Id. at 447.
156. Id. at 463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 441. "The accused should first set up and rely upon his defense in the state
courts, even though this involves a challenge of the validity of some statute, unless it plainly
appears that this course would not afford adequate protection." Id. at 441 (quoting Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971)) (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 441 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
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act appropriately even when prosecutions are initiated on flagrantly
and patently unconstitutional statutes. If a state court has an op-
portunity to consider a constitutional challenge to such a state stat-
ute and fails to strike any part of the proceedings based on that
statute, the federal court need no longer indulge in the presumption
that the state court provides a fair and sufficient forum for vindica-
tion of federal constitutional rights.6 0 In Mitchum v. Foster'"' the
Court, in considering the purpose for enacting the predecessor to
section 1983, concluded that it was clearly intended to enforce the
prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment against state action ei-
ther executive, legislative, or judicial. " The proponents of that orig-
inal federal legislation had noted that state courts were being used
to injure individuals either because they were "powerless to stop
deprivations or [because they were] in league with those bent upon
abrogation of federally protected rights.' '6 3 In a case in which com-
pelling evidence is provided to show that a state judge is either
powerless to stop constitutional violations, as in Dombrowski,'4 or
is assisting in those violations which would be the justifiable conclu-
sion if he failed to strike proceedings on a flagrantly and patently
unconstitutional statute, a federal court should be able to provide
relief. Therefore, in cases in which Younger would ordinarily apply,
the flagrantly unconstitutional exception should be available but
only after the state court has had the opportunity to consider the
matter. Allowing the exception to apply in this manner is consistent
both with the insistence of the Court in Vail that no more than
the opportunity to present one's federal claims in the state pro-
ceedings is required to invoke Younger and with the presumption
that the state court will provide a fair and competent tribunal for
the adjudication of constitutional issues.
There remains the question why the Supreme Court has formu-
lated a presumption which divests federal courts of constitutional
and statutory subject matter jurisdiction. In Younger, Justice Black
160. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
161. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
162. Id. at 240.
163. Id. at 240.
164. In Dombrowski, even though a state judge quashed the initial arrest warrants and
ordered the suppression of evidence seized by state officials in an illegal raid, the officials
continued to threaten the federal plaintiffs with prosecution and to make announcements
that the plaintiff's organization was a subversive or Communist front group and that mem-
bers of such groups must either register with the state or face prosecution. These actions by
state officials frightened off new members and contributors and paralyzed operations of the
organization. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487-89 (1965).
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in referring to the doctrine of equitable restraint admitted that
"[tihe precise reasons for this longstanding public policy . . . have
never been specifically identified but the primary sources . . . Ere
plain.""' These sources were identified as the sensitivity for state
criminal processes, the notion of comity, and "Our Federalism."',"
Since Younger, however, abstention has been expanded to protect
state civil proceedings," 7 so the sensitivity for state criminal pro-
cesses is no longer determinative. Further, Pullman abstention68
rather than Younger seems more consistent with comity and feder-
alism since it works toward cooperation between the sovereigns.
To clarify the distinct interests served by Younger, the factors
which necessarily call for the rule's application must be identified.
The rule is no longer limited to situations in which the state seeks
a criminal remedy but is clearly keyed to the involvement of state
courts.' For the most part, the Court's opinions support the conclu-
sion that the state in its sovereign capacity must be a party to the
state court litigation. 70 What strongly indicates that Younger will
probably not apply in cases between purely private litigants in state
court is the severe effect of application of that rule. Unlike Pullman
abstention, Younger requires the federal court to relinquish jurisdic-
tion-to leave to a state court the determination of issues of federal
law. Also, as is pointed out in Hicks v. Miranda, '" an otherwise
protected state court proceeding instituted subsequent to the fed-
eral action ousts the federal court of jurisdiction.' One effect of this
holding is that the party relying upon state law is given the discre-
tion to divest a federal court of existing jurisdiction by filing suit in
state court. There is no reason apparent in the notions of federalism
and comity that a party who only represents private interests should
be given such remarkable power.' Protecting all litigation in state
165. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
166. Id. at 43-44.
167. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1978) (civil action for fraudently
receiving welfare payments); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338-39 (1977) (civil action involv-
ing judicial contempt proceeding); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975) (quasi-
criminal civil action).
168. See notes 83-87 supra and accompanying text.
169. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,
338-39 (1977).
170. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 449 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327, 334 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
171. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
172. Id. at 349.
173. Sensitivity for the criminal process would not of course, be relevant to state court
proceedings brought by a private party. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the Court
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court regardless of the presence of the state strongly supports the
inference that Younger is really derived from that "blind deference
to 'State Rights' " which Justice Black refused to accept as part of
the concept of "Our Federalism."'7 4 It therefore seems more reasona-
ble to conclude that Younger is not applicable to cases in which the
state is not a party to the challenged state court proceedings.7 5
EXTENSION OF Younger PROTECTION TO SUBSEQUENT STATE
PROCEEDINGS
The Supreme Court stated in Younger that it was not determining
what a federal court must do in the absence of a pending state
prosecution. 7 ' Subsequently, in Steffel v. Thompson,'77 the Court
seemed to so restrict Younger by holding that its standards need not
be met in order for a federal court to enter a declaratory judgment
when no state prosecution was pending. 7 ' In Steffel no showing of
bad faith enforcement or other extraordinary circumstances had
been made by the federal plaintiff,' but he had been warned by
police that he would be arrested for criminal trespass if he did not
stop handing out handbills on an exterior sidewalk of a shopping
center. Steffel left the shopping center to avoid arrest and then filed
suit requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. He subsequently
abandoned. his request for injunctive relief on appeal so that only
the question of declaratory relief was before the Supreme Court. "
The parties stipulated that if Steffel had returned and refused upon
request to stop handbilling, a warrant would have been sworn out
reasoned that Younger did not apply to prevent the federal court from giving injunctive relief
from a "summary extrajudicial process of prejudgment seizure of property." Id. at 71 n.3. The
state court plaintiff, Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., had obtained a writ of replevin simulta-
neously with the filing in small claims court of suit on the underlying debt. The Court's
ground for distinguishing Younger seems clearly inconsistent with Trainor. The absence of
the state as a party would serve as a basis for distinguishing the two cases. See Marshall v.
Chase Manhattan Bank (Nat'l Ass'n), 558 F.2d 680, 684 (2d Cir. 1977).
174. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Justice Blackmun quotes Justice Black's
language in his concurring opinion in Trainor. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 448
(1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
175. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kelly, 583 F.2d 1242, 1249 (3d Cir. 1978); Diaz v. Stathis, 576
F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1978); Marshall v. Chase Manhattan Bank (Nat'l Ass'n), 558 F.2d 680,
684 (2d Cir. 1977). But see Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Kiroff, 1052, 1058-59 (6th Cir. 1977);
Louisville Area Inter-Faith Comm. for United Farm Workers v. Nottingham Liquors, Ltd.,
542 F.2d 652, 654-55 (6th Cir. 1976).
176. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
177. 415 U.S. 454 (1974).
178. Id. at 462.
179. Id. at 456-57.
180. Id. at 456.
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and he might have been arrested and charged with criminal tres-
pass. The Court found that under these circumstances Steffel need
not first expose himself to actual arrest in order to obtain a deterrmi-
nation of his first and fourteenth amendment right to protest in this
manner.' Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, noted that a
"refusal on the part of the federal courts to intervene when no state
proceeding is pending may place the hapless plaintiff between the
Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgo-
ing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity
. . 1"82 He reasoned that when no state proceeding is pending
federal intervention does not disrupt the administration of the state
criminal justice system, especially when federal relief is only pro-
vided through the less abrasive remedy of declaratory judgment. 
83
At this point one would assume that Younger applies only if the
state prosecution is initiated prior to the filing of the federal com-
plaint. In other words whichever court, state or federal, takes juris-
diction first is the one which controls the subsequent litigation.
Slightly more than a year after Steffel, however, the Supreme Court
stated in Hicks v. Miranda"4 that "[n]either Steffel v. Thompson
. . .nor any other case in this Court has held that for Younger v.
Harris to apply, the state criminal proceedings must be pending on
the day the federal case is filed."' 85 In what was an alternative but
perhaps the most significant basis for its decision, the Court held
that "where state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal
plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before any proceed-
ings of substance on the merits have taken place in federal court,
the principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force."' 8 In
Hicks the plaintiff, a theatre owner, had filed a complaint in federal
court seeking an injunction against the enforcement of the Califor-
nia obscenity statute and an injunction ordering the return of all
copies of the film "Deep Throat" seized by California law enforce-
ment officials. The plaintiff had sought and been denied a tempo-
rary restraining order, and after service of his federal complaint he
181. See id. at 459.
182. Id. at 462. Justice Blackmun reasoned in Trainor that the state's interest is less
important for Younger purposes if the state has only threatened and not initiated state
prosecution as in Steffel. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
See generally Kanowitz, Deciding Federal Law Issues in Civil Proceedings: State Versus
Federal Trial Courts, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 141 (1976).
183. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 463 (1974).
184. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
185. Id. at 349.
186. Id. at 349.
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was added as a defendant to state criminal proceedings already
pending against his employees.
The Court provided no precise definition of "proceedings of sub-
stance on the merits" in federal court; but it is clear that if a state
prosecution is initiated prior to that point, any federal equitable
relief must satisfy Younger standards. The mere fact the plaintiff
files his federal complaint before the state prosecution is initiated
no longer has any significance. To allow such a race to the court-
house to have determinative effect would, in the words of the Court,
"trivialize the principles of Younger v. Harris."'7 As a consequence
of Hicks, state law enforcement officials retain discretion, unhin-
dered by federal equity until "proceedings of substance on the mer-
its" in federal court, to decide whether they wish to prosecute in
state court or to allow the case to remain in federal court.
8 8
One commentator has suggested that the phrase substantial pro-
ceedings on the merits has reference to the judicial investment of
the federal court, not to the investment of the parties. "" Investment
by the parties in pretrial discovery, which would not involve the
federal court, would therefore not satisfy a requirement of sub-
stantial proceedings by the federal court. Generally, dismissal of
the federal action after discovery would not disadvantage the
parties and would not constitute a waste of limited federal judicial
resources.' Considering the thrust of the Court's opinion in Hicks,
it is reasonable to assume that the discretion there given to state
officials is not to be divested except for strong reasons.'"' The fed-
eral court should be able, however, at least by the time of trial, to
assume that the state officials either cannot or will not initiate a
187. Id. at 350.
188. See Ohio Bureau of Employment Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977). The
protection provided state law enforcement efforts through application of Younger can be
waived if the state voluntarily submits to a federal forum. See id. at 480.
189. The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 H~Av. L. REv. 47, 161 (1975). "If the central
concern underlying the Court's rule in Hicks is the federal court's investment in the case
before it, then substantiality alone should be the test." Id. at 161 n.62.
190. See id. at 161 n.62. Discovery under the federal rules is for the most part accom-
plished without the assistance of the district judge unless one party refuses to comply.
191. The decision itself does away with the technical matter of which court took jurisdic-
tion first. From the time of Ex parte Young there had existed the "curiously illogical situa-
tion, that if a state officer succeeds in initiating his criminal proceedings in a state court to
enforce an alleged unconstitutional state law, he cannot be enjoined or interfered with by the
federal court; but if he can be caught on the immediate verge of initiating such action, he
may be so enjoined." Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REv. 345,
375 (1930). Hicks put an end to this distinction since the state interest for Younger purposes
was just as important in the latter situation as in the former. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.
332, 349 (1975).
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state proceeding. The Supreme Court has held that a state may
waive the protection it would otherwise have under Younger"'"
and, in addition, when its failure to take action or to notify the
federal court of action contemplated causes the federal court to
rely on an assumed choice of the federal forum, the state should be
estopped from asserting its Younger rights. Read in this fashion,
the "substantive proceedings" rule of Hicks protects the state's
discretion while requiring proper respect for the federal courts.
Except in those cases when the trial on the merits is consolidated
with the hearing on a preliminary injunction, neither the court's
action on an application for a temporary restraining order nor for a
preliminary injunction should amount to substantial proceedings on
the merits. A hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction
can include admission of evidence that becomes part of the record
on trial,"' but the hearing can also occur very early in the federal
proceedings. It would also seem to trivialize Younger principles if
the race to the federal courthouse was replaced by a race to the
hearing on a preliminary injunction. At this point the state officials
may not be properly prepared to initiate their state court action and
a designation at this early point, without more, as "substantial
proceedings" might hinder the wise exercise of their Hicks discre-
tion. If this conclusion is sound, the federal plaintiff is not protected
by reaching the preliminary injunction hearing, since the state offi-
cials would not then be estopped from subsequently bringing a state
court action. Therefore, the federal court cannot issue a preliminary
injunction that interferes with this choice of the state officials unless
Younger standards are satisfied. Because the state officials have not
waived or been estopped from exercising their Hicks discretion, a
federal court cannot have power to divest them of that discretion
unless Younger's extraordinary circumstances are shown.
Six days after deciding Hicks, the Court decided Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc."'i In Doran operators of three topless bars in the town of
North Hempstead, New York, brought a federal action challenging
the constitutionality of a local ordinance making it unlawful to have
topless waitresses, barmaids, and entertainers in bars and sought
injunctive and declaratory relief against its enforcement. Initially
all three complied with the new ordinance; but the day after their
complaint was filed one of the three, M & L Restaurant, Inc., (M &
192. Ohio Bureau of Employment Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977).
193. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (a) (2).
194. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
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L) resumed topless dancing at its establishment and state prosecu-
tion was immediately instituted against it. The Supreme Court de-
termined that the state prosecution against M & L had begun while
the federal proceedings were still in an "embryonic stage and no
contested matter had been decided.""' M & L, therefore, was sub-
ject to Younger in its attempt to obtain federal injunctive and decla-
ratory relief.' 6 The Court went on to hold that the preliminary
injunction issued in favor of the other bar owners was not subject
to Younger.'97 Since no declaratory remedy comparable to a pre-
liminary injunction exists, the Court reasoned that without the
availability of preliminary injunctive relief these plaintiffs may
suffer "unnecessary and. substantial irreparable harm."'' 8 Since
Younger did not apply to these plaintiffs, the injunction could be
granted upon a showing that in its absence the plaintiffs would suf-
fer irreparable injury and that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail
on the merits.'" The Court indicated that a federal court must also
consider the interests of the state since the injunction would pro-
hibit state law enforcement activities; which result '"seriously im-
pairs the state's interest in enforcing its criminal laws, and impli-
cates the concerns for federalism which lie at the heart of
Younger." 00 The standard for granting this injunctive relief, how-
ever, was identified as the traditional standard.2"' Further, the stan-
dard of appellate review for that decision was "simply whether the
issuance of the injunction . . . constituted an abuse of discre-
tion." 02 The plaintiffs had alleged that if they were forced to con-
tinue compliance with the ordinance and were not given injunctive
relief they would suffer substantial loss of business and perhaps
bankruptcy. The Court found that "[c]ertainly the latter type of
injury sufficiently meets the standards for granting interim relief
.... ,"103 These plaintiffs, unlike M & L, were seeking purely pro-
spective relief in that they did not ask for federal relief from a
pending or presently threatened state prosecution. They had not
violated the ordinance and were seeking a preliminary federal deter-
mination of their constitutional challenge so that pending the out-
195. Id. at 929.
196. Id. at 929.
197. Id. at 930.
198. Id. at 931.
199. Id. at 931.
200. Id. at 931.
201. Id. at 931.
202. Id. at 931-32.
203. Id. at 932.
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come of the federal action they could provide topless entertainment
in their bars. Unlike M & L, they had not chosen to violate the
ordinance but were attempting through a lawful procedure to
achieve their purpose.
Like the plaintiff bar owners who were not barred by Younger, M
& L was also seeking, at least in part, prospective relief, but its
complaint was dismissed. At first glance, it would appear that M &
L's claim should have been retained so far as it sought an injunction
against future prosecution for future actions. "4 While Hicks requires
dismissal of any claim for injunctive relief from a pending state
prosecution and Samuels requires dismissal of a claim for declara-
tory relief, neither case mandates total dismissal as suffered by M
& L. 105 The answer evidently lies in the concern over M & L's unlaw-
ful behavior. M & L "[hiaving violated the ordinance, rather than
awaiting the normal development of its federal lawsuit, . . . cannot
now be heard to complain that its constitutional contentions are
being resolved in a state court."20 6 By its own actions M & L caused
the initiation of the state court action and thereby negated the force
of the Steffel justification for providing a federal forum. "7
Doran stands for the proposition that when a federal court is
asked to grant preliminary injunctive relief to restrain future state
prosectutions for the future conduct of the federal plaintiffs,
Younger does not apply. As noted earlier the effect of Hicks would
be nullified if a federal court could, without satisfying Younger
standards, issue a preliminary injunction against a threatened state
prosecution for past violation of state public law. If the federal
plaintiff has not violated state law, state officials theoretically have
no power to prosecute him regardless of what the federal courts may
do. Younger applies, therefore, whenever federal preliminary in-
junctive relief is sought to protect the federal plaintiff from a pend-
ing or future state prosecution for his past conduct, but does not
apply when that relief is sought for his future conduct. Justice Bren-
nan referred to this distinction in Steffel v. Thompson:05
204. The Supreme Court had in early cases decided that the grant of a purely prospective
injunction in this situation was within the power of the federal court. See Cline v. Frink Dairy
Co., 274 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1927); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 567-
68 (1917).
205. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 H~Av. L. REV. 47, 166-67 (1975).
206. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929 (1975).
207. One commentator argues that by violating the state law prior to a federal adjudica-
tion M & L waived its rights to a federal forum. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 47, 167-68 (1975). This concept would arise because of the interest of both federal
and state governments in discouraging violations of law.
208. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
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We note that, in those cases where injunctive relief has been sought
to restrain an imminent, but not yet pending, prosecution for past
conduct, sufficient injury has not been found to warrant injunctive
relief . . . . There is some question, however, whether a showing of
irreparable injury might be made in a case where, although no prose-
cution is pending or impending, an individual demonstrates that he
will be required to forgo constitutionally protected activity in order
to avoid arrest.2"9
The federal court may proceed with a declaratory judgment action
even if the plaintiff has violated state law without meeting the
obstacle of Younger unless a state prosecution is initiated prior to
a point of substantial proceedings on the merits in federal court.
The declaratory judgment proceeding in no way frustrates the
discretion given state prosecutors by Hicks until a judgment is
entered, and this judgment should certainly be a point of substan-
tial proceedings on the merits. Unlike M & L in the Doran case, a
federal plaintiff seeking only declaratory relief under these circum-
stances would not have a forum for presenting his constitutional
challenges.
In addition, a permanent injunction if purely prospective in effect
may also be issued under the circumstances of Wooley v. Maynard21 "
to restrain state law enforcement. In Wooley, Mr. Maynard, a Jeho-
vah's Witness, early in 1974 had begun covering up the New Hamp-
shire state motto, "Live Free or Die," which was embossed on his
auto license plates. A New Hampshire statute made it a misde-
meanor to knowingly obscure the figures or letters on any license
plate and the motto consisted of "letters." As a consequence of
obscuring the motto, Maynard was subjected to three successive
prosecutions within a span of five weeks. He was found guilty in all
three cases and was ultimately sentenced to a total of fifteen days
in jail, which he served. The Supreme Court found that the threat
of repeated, future prosecutions for the exercise of what Maynard
believed to be his first amendment rights and the effect of that
threat on his ability to carry out the normal tasks of living in a
society dependent on the automobile was sufficient to justify perma-
nent injunctive relief.211 Even though the Court used language that
sounded as if "exceptional circumstances" of the Younger kind
might be necessary, the facts and holding of the case show clearly
that Younger was not applied.1 2 The Court, although not as clearly
209. Id. at 463 n.12 (emphasis supplied by the Court).
210. 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
211. Id. at 712.
212. See id. at 711-12. Allowing federal equitable relief was based on the need to free
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as in Doran, established the traditional standard for permanent
injunctive relief for cases in which no state prosecution was pending.
It also found that no state prosecution was pending for Younger
purposes because Maynard had served his entire sentence from the
three convictions and was seeking no federal relief from the effects
of those convictions."' The relief he sought was purely prospective
in that he sought relief from future prosecutions for future conduct
he claimed was constitutionally protected.
Under the holdings in Doran and Wooley one can assume with
regard to purely prospective relief that the federal courts possess
equitable discretion under the traditional standard to grant injunc-
tive relief. The traditional standard, however, requires the Court to
consider the interests of both the federal plaintiff and defendant. In
doing so, the Court would ordinarily give greater weight to the inter-
ests of the federal defendant if he is a representative of a state. The
Supreme Court in Wooley may be seen as stating only what through
experience would be the case. In other words, generally a federal
court will not enjoin the enforcement by a state of its law. This
inaction is because the state's interests are especially weighty and
not because the court lacks discretion under Younger to grant in-
junctive relief. Younger removes this discretion only if the federal
proceedings would hinder or interfere with the efforts of state offi-
cials to prosecute the federal plaintiff for a past violation of state
law.
THE RATIONALE OF Younger
There are close parallels between the state interests implicated by
criminal prosecutions and those implicated in the civil proceedings
given Younger protection. First, the state civil proceedings pro-
tected in Huffman, Vail, and Trainor all included representatives
of the state."' Second, these cases all dealt with federal court inter-
ference with the enforcement of a state law against one who had
the Maynards "from prosecutions for future violations of the same statutes." Id. at 711.
These were not "prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of
obtaining a valid conviction" that would justify a finding of bad faith or harassment. Perez
v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971). The state officials of New Hampshire were obtaining
convictions, and no doubt existed about the guilt of Mr. Maynard. The only question was
the constitutionality of the state's statute and the Court, although holding it unconstitu-
tional, did not see it as flagrantly and patently unconstitutional. See Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705, 714-17 (1977).
213. Id. at 708.
214. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 449 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,
334 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
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already violated or disobeyed that law. In Huffman the state was
seeking to enforce a statute which gave it an exclusive right of
action against one alleged to have repeatedly shown "obscene"
motion pictures."" In Vail only the state could enforce contempt
procedures against those alleged to have totally failed to comply
with orders of the state court."' In Trainor the underlying suit was
one for recovery of public assistance payments made to persons
alleged to have fraudently concealed assets to qualify for assis-
tance."7 Third, as with criminal prosecutions, the state was acting
in its sovereign capacity as a direct representative and protector of
the public interest in enforcing a law only it could enforce.
These three characteristics would not be present in purely private
litigation or in civil litigation in which the defendants were not
"violators" of the law. For instance, a state court proceeding in
which the state sought to exercise its power of eminent domain
would not include the second characteristic." ' It is certainly argua-
ble that in this case the considerations prompting application of
Younger are not present since interference by a federal court impli-
cates none of the dangers for the state's ability to regulate its people
through law. Although the state is present, it is not enforcing the
law in the sense mostpeople understand that language and, there-
fore, the state court process does not'implicate the state's sover-
eignty in the same sense that the word is used in Younger. Justice
Blackmun approached this point in a different manner by empha-
sizing that in Trainor the option of the state to proceed either civilly
or criminally demonstrated a common underlying state interest."'
He reasoned that the applicability of Younger abstention should not
be justified solely on a basis of the kind of remedy sought by the
state.20 Rather, the state must be allowed prosecutorial discretion
including the right-to opt for a civil rather than a criminal remedy.22'
The main thrust of Younger, therefore, is toward allowing unhin-
dered control by the states over the enforcement of their laws. This
control is perceived by the Supreme Court to be a necessary element
of sovereignty.2 A government without this ultimate power over its
215. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,.604 (1975).
216. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977).
217. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 435 (1977).
218. The federal court could, however, decide that Pullman abstention was required. See
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).
219. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 449 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
220. See id. at 449-50 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
221. See id. at 449-50 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
222. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S, 37, 53 (1971).
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citizenry is more an agency of a higher authority than a sovereign.
The Court, however, cannot provide the state courts with a preexist-
ing exclusive jurisdiction to punish violations of state law because
prosecutors might choose to not bring suit. A person might then be
left in the Steffel dilemma of forcing a criminal prosecution by
further violation of law or of forgoing constitutional activity,22 3 and
the Court cannot reasonably encourage either result.
The Hicks decision traces a middle path by granting state courts
primary jurisdiction over all issues raised by an alleged violation of
state law."' State jurisdiction, if exercised, ousts the federal court
of its secondary jurisdiction;22 5 but if not, then the federal court can
adjudicate the issues.2" In this way the Supreme Court has provided
protection for state prosecutorial discretion without subjecting the
federal plaintiff to the Steffel dilemma since a forum will always be
available.2 7 The choice of forum under Younger, however, is given
to the state, not to someone who has allegedly violated state law.
To maintain the sovereign authority of the states necessary for
carrying out their law enforcement responsibilities, the Supreme
Court has established the strong presumption that a state court
chosen as the forum by state officials for adjudication of state issues
is also an adequate forum for adjudication of all federal issues.
Under this presumption the state need only show that the federal
plaintiff had the opportunity to assert his federal defenses in state
court. If there was no opportunity, then the federal court may pro-
vide a forum for those issues since the state court by definition does
not provide a forum at all. In Gerstein v. Pugh22 the Supreme Court
held that Younger did not prevent issuance of a federal court order
requiring the provision of a hearing on probable cause to those ar-
rested and charged on information in Florida.229 The reason for not
applying Younger was the inability of a prisoner to challenge the
legality of pretrial detention in his criminal prosecution. 23 " Also, the
federal court orders did not prejudice the conduct of the trial on the
merits. 23
,
223. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 463 (1974).
224. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975).
225. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971); see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349
(1975).
226. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974).
227. See id. at 462.
228. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
229. See id. at 108 n.9.
230. See id. at 108 n.9.
231. See id. at 108 n.9.
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Once the opportunity to present federal defenses in state court
exists, the presumption of adequacy applies, and a party can escape
the primary jurisdiction of the state court only by a clear showing
that the particular state tribunal is inadequate.23 ' Inadequacy is
shown if the state court is clearly biased, is clearly unable to protect
the constitutional rights of the defendant against the bad faith en-
forcement efforts of prosecutorial officials, or is clearly in league
with those seeking to deny defendant's constitutional rights. 3 ' Inad-
equacy is not shown by disagreement on a constitutional issue be-
tween a state and a federal court: this disagreement is only signifi-
cant when the federal judge can find that reasonable people could
not find the challenged state statute constitutional. Further, the
federal court cannot even enter upon any such consideration until
the state court has had the opportunity to cure any flagrant and
patent constitutional defects in state law.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Younger arises from the assumption that the states must and
should have the primary responsibility for controlling society
through law. In order to fulfill this responsibility they must have the
freedom to control the whole of their law enforcement processes.
Younger provided freedom from federal court interference with
pending state criminal prosecutions. By foreclosing discussion of the
substantive issues in federal court, the Court dissolved any discre-
tion the federal courts might have exercised to even temporarily
delay state prosecutions. With Huffman and Hicks the Court
fleshed out the Younger protection so that the states now enjoy
prosecutorial discretion. Should a serious constitutional challenge
arise, the Supreme Court can review and thereby control the states'
law enforcement process. The shift in federal court authority from
the district courts to the Supreme Court substantially reduces the
frequency of interference with state prosecutions and thereby re-
duces irritation between federal and state systems.
Younger is characterized by its relative inflexibility. Exceptions
are allowed only for certain extraordinary cases that would seem-
ingly result only from the breakdown of a state's legal institutions.
Absolutes, however, are and should be rare in the law so I can
foresee more flexibility once the Court becomes more confident
232. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973).
233. See notes 114-119 supra and accompanying text.
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with its new doctrine. This flexibility may well occur whenever the
federal litigant can show he did not knowingly violate state law.
The Doran case evidences the sympathy of the Court for those who
come into federal court with clean hands. Persons who lawfully seek
an adjudication of their constitutional rights should not be denied
their choice of a federal forum. To fulfill the promise of Doran the
Court should, however, also reconsider its restrictive standing re-
quirements so that these do not, in effect, promote unlawful behav-
ior even as a matter of strategy.
One can legitimately say that the heart of the Younger doctrine
is the fundamental need for caution on the part of federal courts in
their dealings with state law enforcement. Less fundamental, how-
ever, is the perceived need for absolute protection for state pro-
cesses. This part of Younger more: likely arises from the mood of this
decade in the same way Dombrowski was a product of the sixties.
